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Abstract The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in
a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive
content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and o¤ers advice on
when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of
a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises
a better treatment of meaning than that o¤ered by Bohr. Quantum theory
models physical systems with no mention of measurement: it is decoherence,
not measurement, that licenses application of Borns probability rule. So
quantum theory also o¤ers advice on its own application. I show how this
works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both
laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum eld
theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere.
PACS 03.65.Yz, 03.65.Ta, 01.70.+w
1 Introduction
One can treat the delocalization of phase of a quantum system through in-
teraction with its environment simply by applying the formalism of quantum
theory without regard to its interpretation. But the interest of many re-
searchers in the conceptual foundations of quantum theory has been piqued
by the potential contributions of environmental decoherence to an interpre-
tation of quantum theory capable of solving long-standing puzzles about the
role of measurement.
The quantum theory of decoherence is important for the pragmatist in-
terpretation of quantum theory outlined in [1]. It governs the descriptive
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2content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and advises an agent
on when to apply the Born Rule as a guide to their truth. But, on this inter-
pretation, it does so without representing the dynamic behavior of physical
systems: for while it is quantum states that are subject to environmental de-
coherence, the quantum state does not serve to represent or describe physical
systems. Because the familiar view that quantum models of environmental
decoherence o¤er representations of a physical process conicts with a non-
representational view of the quantum state, I rst explain how the quantum
state functions, according to this pragmatist interpretation.
Section 3 then shows in a simple model how decoherence governs the
content of descriptive claims about a qubit. The content of a claim is to be
understood in terms of what inferences an agent may draw from that claim
and what would entitle an agent to make it. This inferentialist pragmatism
about conceptual content promises a better treatment of meaning than that
o¤ered by Bohr and his followers.1
Quantum theory assigns probabilities to claims about the values of mag-
nitudes through the Born Rule. But it is now well established that these
magnitudes cannot consistently all be taken simultaneously to possess precise
values on each system, distributed over a collection of similar systems in such
a way that the fractions of systems with particular values for each magnitude
match the corresponding probabilities owing from the Born Rule.2 Consis-
tency then restricts each application of the Born Rule to a proper subset
of all magnitudes. Conventionally, one species probabilities only for mea-
surement outcomes, and postulates that only those magnitudes represented
by pairwise commuting self-adjoint operators are simultaneously measurable.
But Bell([14], [11]) raised powerful objections against incorporating measure-
mentinto the basic principles of quantum theory, either as a primitive term
or when cashed out in equally unsatisfactory terms such as "irreversible am-
plication", "classical system", or "conscious observation". The pragmatist
interpretation of [1] relies on quantum models of environmental decoherence
that involve no reference to measurement to secure consistent application of
the Born Rule. Section 3 shows how this works.
The general account of section 3 is illustrated in section 4 by applying
it to some more realistic examples, both in a laboratory setting and in the
universe at large. These are intended to show how the details of environmental
decoherence can a¤ect the signicance of descriptive claims licensed by a
quantum state, and to exhibit both the practical use of the Born Rule and
its limitations.
The paper ends by summarizing its conclusions and pointing to questions
that still need to be answered to achieve a fully adequate account of environ-
mental decoherence within the pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory
outlined in [1].
1 Here I am indebted to the writings of Brandom([2], [3]) and Price([4], [5]). Bohr
expressed his views in a number of essays collected in Bohr([6], [7], [8]).
2 See, for example, [9], [10], [11], [12], [13].
32 The function of the quantum state
The delocalization of phase in a systems quantum state due to interaction
with systems constituting its environment is generally regarded as a physical
process. Quantum models compare and contrast this process with other, more
familiar, physical processes such as dissipation due to energy loss into the en-
vironment. Quantum decoherence need not be accompanied by dissipation,
though when it is, it is typically a much faster process. Some say that quan-
tum decoherence occurs as a result of a system acting on its environment,
whereas dissipation occurs because the system is acted on by its environ-
ment. Such language in which discussions of environmental decoherence are
couched is thoroughly physical. Master equations and other mathematical
treatments of quantum decoherence are taken to represent how the physical
condition of a system changes in response to its interaction with its envi-
ronment when that interaction is represented by an interaction Hamiltonian.
But the immediate content of such treatments concerns the evolution of a
systems quantum state. To read a representation of the evolution of a quan-
tum state as a description of the changing condition of the system to which it
pertains is to adopt a particular interpretative stance toward quantum states.
It is to assume that a quantum state provides a description of the physical
condition of a system to which it is assigned.
But this is only one, disputed, view of the function of the quantum state.
On the present pragmatist understanding, the function of the quantum state
is not to describe but to prescribe: A quantum state does not provide even an
incomplete description of a physical system to which is assigned. Instead, by
assigning a quantum state, a user G of quantum theory takes the rst step
in a procedure that licenses G to express claims about physical systems in
descriptive language and then warrants G in adopting appropriate epistemic
attitudes toward some such claims. The language in which these claims are
expressed is not the language of quantum states or operators, and the claims
are not about probabilities or measurement results: they are about the values
of magnitudes. That is why I refer to such claims as NQMCs Non-Quantum
Magnitude Claims. Here are some typical examples of NQMCs:
A helium atom with energy  24:6 electron volts has zero angular
momentum.
Silver atoms emerging from a Stern-Gerlach device each have angular-
momentum component either +~=2 or  ~=2 in the z-direction.
The fourth photon will strike the left-hand side of the screen.
When a constant voltage V is applied across a Josephson junction, an
alternating current I with frequency 2(e=h)V ows across the junction.
(Notice that two of these non-quantum claims are stated in terms of Plancks
constant.)
Any user of quantum theory is a physically situated cognitive agent. That
includes physicists and other humans in a position to benet from quantum
advice in a wide variety of circumstances. But nothing rules out the possibil-
ity of non-human, or even non-conscious agents. A user of quantum theory
must be physically situated because a quantum state and consequent Born
probabilities can be assigned to a system only relative to the physical situa-
4tion of an (actual or hypothetical) agent for whom these assignments would
yield good epistemic advice. What one agent should believe may be quite
di¤erent from what another agent in a di¤erent physical, and therefore epis-
temic, situation should nd credible. This relational character of quantum
states and Born probabilities does not make these subjective, and it may
be neglected whenever users of quantum theory nd themselves in relevantly
similar physical situations. NQMCs are also objective, but, unlike claims per-
taining to quantum states and Born probabilities, they are not relational in
this way: Their truth-values do not depend on the physical situation of any
actual or hypothetical agent.
A quantum state is objective because it provides authoritative guidance
to an agent on two important matters. It provides sound advice both on the
content of NQMCs concerning physical systems and on the credibility of some
of these claims. Environmental decoherence gures in both these roles of the
quantum state. Section 3.2 shows how decoherence enables the quantum state
to play the rst advisory role: section 3.3 is concerned with its contribution
to the second. Note that this pragmatist interpretation does not deny that
environmental decoherence involves a physical process: but it does deny that
a systems quantum state plays any role in describing or representing such a
process. An agent requires guidance in assessing the content of NQMCs about
systems of interest. It is often said that assignment of a value to an observable
on a system is meaningful only in the presence of some apparatus capable of
measuring the value of that observable. But some account of meaning must
be o¤ered in support of this assertion, and the extreme operationist account
that is most naturally associated with it would be unacceptably vague even
if it were otherwise defensible. Exactly what counts as the presence of an
apparatus capable of measuring the value of an observable?
Contemporary pragmatist accounts of meaning have the resources to pro-
vide a better account of the meaning of a NQMC about a system, as enter-
tained by an agent, in a context in which that system features. A pragmatist
like Brandom([2], [3]) takes the content of any claim to be articulated by the
material inferences (practical as well as theoretical) in which it may gure as
premise or conclusion. These inferences may vary with the context in which a
claim arises, so the content of the claim depends on that context. The quan-
tum state of a system modulates the content of NQMCs about that system
by specifying the context in which they arise. This depends on the nature
and degree of environmental decoherence su¤ered by this quantum state. A
NQMC about a system whose quantum state has extensively decohered in
a basis of eigenstates of the operator corresponding to that magnitude has
a correspondingly well-dened meaning: a rich content accrues to it via the
large variety of material inferences that may legitimately be drawn to and
from the NQMC in that context.
Only when the content of a canonical NQMC (of the form Q 2, where
Q is a magnitude and  is a Borel set of real numbers) is su¢ ciently well
articulated in this way is it appropriate to apply the Born Rule to assess the
credibility of that claim. With a su¢ ciently extended license, an agent may
apply the Born Rule to evaluate the probability of each licensed NQMC of
the form Q 2 using the appropriate quantum state.
53 The content and credibility of NQMCs
3.1 A simple model of decoherence
Consider a simple model of decoherence introduced by Zurek[15] and further
discussed in Cucchetti, Paz and Zurek[16]. This features a single quantum
system A interacting with a second "environment" system E as in [16].3 A is
a single qubit, and its environment E is modeled by a collection of N qubits.
One can think of each qubit as realized by a spin 12 system, so that j*i (j+i)
represent z-spin up (down) eigenstates of the Pauli spin operator ^z of A,
while j"ik (j#ik) represent z-spin up (down) eigenstates of ^kz for the the kth
environment spin subsystem.
The individual Hamiltonians H^A, H^E of A and E are assumed to be zero,
while the interaction Hamiltonian H^AE has the form
H^AE =
1
2
^z 

NX
k=1
gk^
k
z : (1)
If A, E are assumed to be initially assigned pure, uncorrelated states
 A = (a j*i+ b j+i) ; (2)
 E =
NY
k=1
(k j"ik + k j#ik) (3)
then the initial state
	(0) =  A 
  E (4)
evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, becoming
	(t) = (a j*i jE*(t)i+ b j+i jE+(t)i) (5)
at time t where
jE*(t)i =
NY
k=1
 
ke
igkt j"ik + ke igkt j#ik

= jE+( t)i : (6)
The state of A, calculated by tracing over the Hilbert space of E, is therefore
^A(t) = jaj2 j*i h*j+ abr(t) j*i h+j+ abr(t) j+i h*j+ jbj2 j+i h+j : (7)
The coe¢ cient r(t) = hE*(t)jE+(t)i appearing in the o¤-diagonal terms of ^A
here is
r(t) =
NY
k=1
h
cos 2gkt+ i

jkj2   jkj2

sin 2gkt
i
: (8)
3 Zureks original model also included a third system S: his choice of notation
then was intended to help his reader bear in mind an application of the model to
a system S interacting with a quantum apparatus A.
6Cucchetti, Paz and Zurek[16] show that jr(t)j tends to decrease rapidly with
increasing N and very quickly approaches zero with increasing t. More pre-
cisely, while jr(t)j2 uctuates, its average magnitude at any time is propor-
tional to 2 N , and, for fairly generic values of the gk, it decreases with time
according to the Gaussian rule jr(t)j2 _ e   2t2 , where   depends on the
distribution of the gk as well as the initial state of E. This result is relatively
insensitive to the initial state of E, which need not be assumed to have the
product form (3), though if the environment is initially in an eigenstate of
(1) jr(t)j = 1 so the state of A will su¤er no decoherence. Since r(t) is an
almost periodic function of t for nite N , it will continue to return arbitrar-
ily closely to 1 at various times: but for N corresponding to a macroscopic
environment Zurek[15] estimated that the corresponding "recurrence" time
exceeds the age of the universe.
3.2 NQMCs in this simple model
Suppose an agent G is considering what claims to entertain about the system
A in this simple model. G is not explicitly represented in the model itself.
But since any assignment of quantum states is from the perspective of some
actual or hypothetical physically instantiated agent, we must assume that
G has implicitly adopted such a perspective by assigning the states that
gure in the model. Magnitudes pertaining to A correspond to self-adjoint
operators on the Hilbert space HA. In this simple model, any such operator
Q^ may be expressed as a real linear sum of Pauli spin operators and the
identity operator on HA as follows
Q^ = x^x + y^y + z^z + cI^: (9)
So the canonical NQMCs under consideration by G are claims about A of the
form K : Q 2, where  is a Borel set of real numbers, and Q corresponds
uniquely to the operator Q^. After setting Si  (~=2)i (i = x; y; z) these
include
I = 1 (A)
Sx 2 f+~=2; ~=2g (B)
Sx = +~=2 (C)
Sz 2 f+~=2; ~=2g (D)
Sz = +~=2 (E)
Gs primary interest is in his entitlement to believe a claim K about A,
including each of the claims (A)-(E). But his rst concern is what content is
expressed by such a claim, and so he should consult the quantum state of A.
Claim (A) is vacuous. It never warrants further claims about A. What is
the content of each of (B)-(E) given only the initial state (2) G assigns to
A? That depends on the inferential role of each claim. G may be tempted
to infer claim (D) about A from the fact that (2) expresses this state as a
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equally well as a superposition of eigenstates j(=i ; j=)i of ^x
 A = (c j(=i+ d j=)i) ; where c = 1p
2
(a+ b) ; d =
1p
2
(a  b) : (10)
(or indeed of any operator of the form Q^.) So if the content of a claim of
the form K then depended only on the state (2) then G should be equally
tempted to make claim (B) (as well as every other similar claim assigning
some eigenvalue of Q^ to every magnitude Q in that state.) Feynman[17,
vol.III, 1.9] warned against an analogous temptation in the famous 2-slit
experiment in these words:
if one has a piece of apparatus which is capable of determining whether
the electrons go through hole 1 or hole 2, then one can say it goes
through either hole 1 or hole 2. [otherwise] one may not say that an
electron goes through either hole 1 or hole 2. If one does say that, and
starts to make any deductions from the statement, he will make errors
in the analysis. This is the logical tightrope on which we must walk if
we wish to describe nature successfully.
The simple model represents no analogous piece of apparatus capable of
determining whether (C) or (C0): Sx =  ~=2 is true, so Feynman would
warn G against saying (B) unless G declines to make any inferences from
(B). (B) is an exclusive disjunction, and the problematic inferences to be
barred would proceed by disjunction elimination by deriving a (false) con-
clusion from each disjunct separately and hence drawing that conclusion on
the basis of the disjunction alone. In the two-slit experiment, the assump-
tion that each electron goes through one slit or the other leads to the false
conclusion that the interference pattern on the screen is the sum of a pat-
tern formed by electrons going through "hole" 1 and a pattern formed by
electrons going through "hole" 2. But to derive that conclusion, one needs
further to assume that the behavior of an electron going through "hole" 1(2)
is the same whether or not "hole" 2(1) is open an assumption rejected by
Bohmians, among others.
This illustrates an important point. The inferences that contribute to the
content of an NQMC are not restricted to mathematically and logically valid
inferences, but include what Sellars[18] called material inferences. Indeed,
according to a pragmatist inferentialist account of content it is precisely such
material inferences that contribute essentially to empirical content. But, as
in this case, what material inferences a claim licenses will depend on what
other assumptions are made.
The content of (C) and (C0) must be restricted so as to exclude their use
even in hypothetical material inferences when A is in state (2). Without such
a restriction, G could infer that Sx,Sz (and indeed all other spin components)
have precise real values together in state (2). While this is not a contradiction,
it does conict with generally accepted background assumptions.4
4 A similar conclusion in the 3-dimensional Hilbert space of a spin 1 system would
be inconsistent with Gleasons theorem [9].
8State (2) is an eigenstate of the operator
^'  (sin  cos') ^x + (sin  sin') ^y + cos ^z; (11)
where a = cos =2 exp ( i'=2), b = sin =2 exp (+i'=2). This state may be
represented on the Bloch sphere by a unit vector n with angular coordinates
(; '). The operator S^n = (~=2) ^' corresponds to a component Sn of an-
gular momentum in a spatial direction n with spherical coordinates (; ')
dened with respect to the (x; y; z) Cartesian coordinate system. Consider
the claim
Sn = +~=2 (F)
Since (2) is an eigenstate of S^n with eigenvalue +~=2, G may be tempted to
make claim (F) solely on the basis of that initial state assignment to A. But
before doing so, G should assess (F)s content.
Since the content of (F) is a function of its inferential role,Gmust consider
what could entitle him to infer (F) and what he could infer from (F). G could
immediately infer (F) from (2) in accordance with this interpretative principle
(EVI):
If a systems quantum state ^ satises P^i^ = ^, where P^i projects onto
the eigenspace with eigenvalue qi of an operator Q^ corresponding to
magnitude Q, then Q has value qi.
But G should reject (EVI) as incompatible with the pragmatist denial
that a systems quantum state provides any kind of description of that sys-
tem. Alternatively, G might think to infer (F) using the EPR [19, p.777]
su¢ cient condition of reality.
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding to this
physical quantity.
His thought might be that application of the Born Rule to (2) would
assign probability unity to the claim Sn = +~=2, and then (F) follows from
(EPR)s reality condition. But this thought is mistaken whatever the status
of that criterion. G is entitled to apply the Born Rule to state (2) to assign
a probability (unity) to (F) only if (F) has su¢ cient content to permit that
application. But the empirical content of (F) is exactly what is in question.
Clearly, it would be circular for G to assume that (F) has su¢ cient content
to entitle him to apply the Born Rule to (F) in state (2) in order to argue
that (F) has any signicant empirical content! In fact the Born Rule is not
applicable to this claim in the simple model, in which the only interaction to
which A is subject is modeled by (1): For G to be entitled to apply the Born
Rule to assign a probability to (F) at t = 0, A would have to be subject to
an interaction that decohered eigenstates of S^n at t = 0.
9In state (2) G may infer from (F) to any claims validly deducible by logic
and mathematics alone, such as these:
Sn 2 f+~=2; ~=2g
(Sn = +~=2) or (Sn = +~)
S2n = ~2=4
So it is not strictly correct to say that (F) is vacuous in this case. But in order
to have any physical content, (F) would have to permit material inferences
that are neither logically nor mathematically valid.
In classical physics, NQMCs typically permit material inferences of two
kinds: dynamic inferences and measurement inferences. An assumption of
continuity guarantees that ascription to a magnitude of a value in set  at
time t licenses a material inference to its value in set " at t+", where " is
"close" to  for su¢ ciently small ": and ascription to a magnitude of a value
in set  at time t licenses a material inference that the result of a su¢ ciently
carefully conducted measurement at t + " would nd a value in ". Since
G can make neither kind of material inference from (F), (F) lacks physical
content here it is empirically vacuous, as are (C) and (C0). The initial state
(2) licenses G to make no physically signicant claims about A.
But Gs resources are not conned to the assignment of an initial state
to A. Using this simple model of decoherence, G also species how the ini-
tial quantum state of A evolves under the inuence of interaction with its
environment. It is the role of decoherence here that endows certain NQMCs
about A with empirical signicance, according to the interpretation outlined
in [1].
The quantum state initially assigned by G to A evolves, so that after a
remarkably short time T it will come to approach the diagonal form
^A = jaj2 j*i h*j+ jbj2 j+i h+j : (12)
If  = 0 or  (i.e. jaj2 or jbj2 = 1) in state (2), then claim (F) reduces re-
spectively to (E) or to (E0): Sz =  ~=2. Each of these is now physically
signicant not because of the initial state (2), but as a result of how the
simple model treats As interaction with E. It is only because of this environ-
mental decoherence that G can entertain any physically signicant NQMCs
about A: these include (D), (E) and (E0), but not (A)-(C).
While (A)-(C) remain empirically vacuous in state (12), (D), (E) and (E0)
have empirical content because of the material inferences each supports. G
may use (D) in inferences that assume that just one of its disjuncts is true
in state (12), even if he has no empirical basis for claiming (E) as against
(E0) (or vice versa). The material inference to (D) at time T is not justied
by the state of A alone, but because the state of A continues to remain very
close to (12) for an extended interval including T , and is in that sense stable
against the environmental interaction G models by (1).
While (EVI) is false, a pragmatist interpretation of the quantum state
does endorse this particular consequence of (EVI) because at T each of (E),
(E0) permits the dynamic and measurement inferences discussed four para-
graphs back. This illustrates the importance of environmental decoherence in
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endowing an NQMC with empirical content. Deployment of the simple model
of decoherence cannot by itself justify G in making a material inference either
to (E) or to (E0). Rather, as section 3.3 explains, assignment of state (12) to
A in the context of this model justies G in making the practical inference
involved in adopting degree of belief (credence) jaj2 in (E) and credence jbj2
in (E0). On this pragmatist interpretation it is a basic assumption of any
application of a quantum model that an agent such as G can subsequently
come to be warranted in believing (E) as against (E0) (or vice versa) by ex-
perience. It follows that the process of observation or experimentation which
would give rise to such an experience of an agent G applying a quantum
model can nowhere be represented within the model G is applying. It does
not follow that this process cannot itself be modeled by another agent G0,
although G0s model could not be extended to encompass processes that give
rise to any experiences of G0 it may lead G0 to expect.
Environmental decoherence is not perfect, even in this simple model. As
it evolves, the state of A arrived at by tracing over E in state (5) will be
exactly diagonal in some orthogonal basis of eigenstates of ^ { for  almost
always extremely close, but not equal, to zero. (Here  varies over the angle
of inclination to the z axis, and  over the azimuthal angle from the x axis).
Consider a claim about A of the form L for some pair ( ; ):
S  2 f+~=2; ~=2g L
If  is close enough to zero, then (1) will very rapidly, and quite stably, bring
the state of A almost as close to diagonal in a basis of eigenstates of S^  as of
S^z. A material inference to a claim of the form L in the context of the model
will be almost as good as the inference to (D), and the inferential power of
a claim of the form L will be almost as great as that of (D). More generally,
the empirical content of a claim of the form L here is a function of  , varying
continuously from its maximum value for  = 0;  to zero for  = =2. It
corresponds to the reliability of the inference from the claim that S  has
one of its eigenvalues at time t to the conclusion that S  has that same
eigenvalue at t+ " and that this would also be the result of a well-conducted
measurement of S  at time t+ ".
What is the relation between the interaction modeled by (1), the possibil-
ity of measuring the value of a magnitude Q in the simple model, and what it
takes to have a piece of apparatus which is capable of determining the value
of a magnitude Q? The model itself makes no mention of any apparatus or
measurement. But in applying the model, an agent G is e¤ectively committed
to counting the interaction modeled by (1) as itself a potential measurement
of Sz that excludes measurements of other magnitudes S  with  far from
0;  while simultaneously serving as a somewhat less reliable measurement
of magnitudes S  with  very close to 0; . G makes this commitment by
taking it for granted that the process being modeled had or will have a de-
terminate outcome that G could come to recognize as indicating the value of
Sz by examining either A itself or some part of E. G is thereby committed
to regarding the whole system being modeled as e¤ectively including an ap-
paratus capable of determining the value of Sz, but excluding any apparatus
capable of determining the value of any magnitude S  with  far from 0; .
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3.3 The Born Rule in the simple model
The references of footnote 2 show there is no consistent simultaneous assign-
ment of a Born probability to every NQMC ascribing a precise value to a
magnitude on a system. According to [1], the function of the Born Rule is
to advise an agent on what credence to attach to certain NQMCs. Since an
agent can attach some credence only to an empirically signicant claim, this
immediately restricts applications of the Born Rule to empirically signicant
canonical NQMCs.
As section 3.2 made clear, not every NQMC concerning a system is equally
empirically signicant even when that system is subject to environmental
decoherence: Empirical signicance comes in degrees here. As  varies, the
empirical signicance of a claim of the form L varies accordingly, as does
that of any claim about A of the form M :
S  2  M
Empirical signicance has no natural cut-o¤ here, or in any application of
quantum theory. So this restriction on application of the Born Rule does
not yield a precise selection criterion. This is a classic case of vagueness.
The Born Rule is clearly applicable to claims (D), (E), (E0) in the simple
model, and clearly inapplicable to claims (A), (B), (C), (C0). But the limits
of applicability of the Born Rule to a claim of the form L or M may be set
anywhere within a wide (but equally indeterminate) range of values of  in
the neighborhoods of 0; . Does this vagueness matter?
Some take quantum theory to be fundamental because it provides our
most accurate descriptions of nature call this fundamentala. But Bell [11,
pp.125-6] criticized contemporary formulations of quantum theory on the
grounds that these are fundamentally approximate and intrinsically inexact.
"Surely", he asked in [14], "after 62 years we should have an exact formula-
tion of some serious part of quantum mechanics?" Bell denied that quantum
theory is fundamentala, because contemporary formulations are in terms of
observables rather than what he called beables:
It is not easy to identify precisely which physical processes are to be
given the status of observations and which are to be relegated to
the limbo between one observation and another. So it could be hoped
that some increase in precision might be possible by concentration on
the beables, which can be described in classical terms, because they
are there. [11, p.52]
Bell would surely have rejected the pragmatist interpretation of [1]. He
would have taken the vagueness inherent in the conditions of applicability
of the Born Rule to introduce an unacceptable imprecision into the the-
ory, and regarded quantum theory under this interpretation as not a serious
theory a serious candidate for the job of truly describing nature. But, in this
pragmatist view, quantum theory achieves its unprecedented success without
describing nature, either vaguely or precisely.
Interpreted along the lines of [1], an agent does not use a quantum-
theoretic model to represent physical systems: quantum theory is not itself
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in the business of describing physical reality. Since quantum theory does not
yield descriptions of nature, it is clearly not a fundamentala theory. But it
is fundamental in another sense: it gives us our best and only way of pre-
dicting and explaining a host of otherwise puzzling phenomena. We do this
using quantum models not to describe reality but to advise us on what to
believe about it. Any such use depends on application of the Born Rule. So
the predictive and explanatory successes we achieve using quantum theory
depend on judicious application of that rule.
Now one can see why any vagueness associated with application of the
Born Rule does not matter. Application of a theory or rule always requires
judgment, and this is no exception. In applying any physical theory one must
rst decide how to model the part or aspect of the physical world on which the
application is targeted. The model of section 3.1 was called simple because
it has few if any real world targets a wise agent would rarely if ever decide
to apply it. When applying a quantum-theoretic model, an agent must make
a further decision about which NQMCs are apt for application of the Born
Rule. Here, too, good judgment is called for.
Models of quantum theory are not inherently imprecise. Their speci-
cation need contain none of Bells[11, p.215] "proscribed words" measure-
ment, apparatus, environment, microscopic, macroscopic, reversible,
irreversible, observable, informationor measurement, though one may
use any of these words harmlessly in commenting on the model with a view to
its intended applications, as several of these words were used in section 3.1.5
Any element of imprecision or inexactness can enter only when a quantum
model is applied to a specic physical situation.
The Born Rule itself is in no way imprecise or inexact: specically, a state-
ment of the Rule should not contain measurementor any other similarly
problematic terms The Born Rule simply assigns a mathematical probability
measure to all canonical NQMCs about A of the form K for every single mag-
nitude Q in the simple model. In a model with a higher-dimensional Hilbert
space for A, the Born Rule also assigns a joint probability measure to sets of
NMQCs {Ki}, where the corresponding Q^i pairwise commute. In applying
the model, an agent needs to judge which of these mathematical measures
should be taken to govern credence and which lack cognitive signicance in
this application. Previous experience, as ltered through vague categories
such as those criticized by Bell may improve this judgment. But, just as in
classical physics, quantum theory can help structure the agents deliberation
by making available enlarged models that take account of the interaction of
the target system with its environment, whether this is thought of as an ex-
perimental arrangement or just the natural physical situation in which the
target system nds itself. In application, quantum theory is no more inexact
than classical physics.
5 It does seem necessary to use a word like system to say what is ascribed a
quantum state in a quantum model. But with no mention of any apparatus, the
model cannot enshrine the "shifty split" between system and apparatus of which
Bell complained.
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4 Examples of NQMCs and use of the Born Rule
In this section I extend the discussion to more realistic examples. Labora-
tory experiments in a controlled environment provide the clearest examples.
But the universe at large supplies an environment for natural processes that
furnish some of the most interesting applications of quantum theory.
4.1 Molecular interference lithography of C60
Ju¤man et al. [20] prepared a beam of C60 molecules with well-dened ve-
locity v, passed them through two gratings of a Talbot-Lau interferometer
in a high vacuum, and collected them on a carefully prepared silicon surface
placed at the Talbot distance. They then moved the silicon about a meter
into a second high vacuum chamber and scanned the surface with a scanning
tunneling electron microscope (STM) capable of imaging individual atoms
on the surface of the silicon. After running the microscope over a square area
of approximately 2m2 they were able to produce an image of some one to
two thousand C60 molecules forming an interference pattern. They reported
that the surface binding of the fullerenes was so strong that they could not
observe any clustering, even over two weeks. Clearly they felt no compunc-
tion in attributing very well dened, stable, positions to the molecules on
the silicon surface, and even recommended developing this experiment into
a technique for controlled deposition for nano-technological applications.
Assuming the process is stationary, one can assign fullerenes in the beam
a quantum state at each position z along the interferometer axis by replacing
t in the Schrödinger equation by z=v. To account for the interference pattern
in this experiment, one can then use the Schrödinger equation to calculate the
quantum state at the silicon surface and apply the Born Rule to calculate
a fullerene probability density at a particular location at distance x from
the interferometer axis in a direction perpendicular to the slit orientation.
Application of the Born Rule would lead one condently to expect formation
of the observed interference pattern for a large enough number of fullerenes,
while acknowledging that this condence falls short of certainty.
There was no mention of decoherence in this account, which simply as-
sumed one can apply the Born Rule to NQMCs of the form x for fullerenes
at the silicon surface. But the account involved no such application to fullerenes
passing through the interferometer from the oven to the surface. The title of
Ju¤man et al.[20] points to a common way of talking about single-particle
interference experiments like this. One says that a C60 molecule acts like a
particle at the surface (so it is meaningful to ascribe it a determinate position
there) but a wave in the interferometer (so it is meaningless to say that it
passed through just one slit of the central grating). The pragmatist interpre-
tation outlined in [1] endorses this way of talking, but only as a gloss on the
more nuanced account made possible by the application of an inferentialist
view of empirical content within a quantum model of decoherence.
It is impracticable to formulate and solve the Schrödinger equation for the
entire many-body quantum interaction that begins with the binding of a C60
molecule to the silicon surface. It is clear that this will rapidly and strongly
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couple the C60 molecule to an environment of an exponentially increasing
number of degrees of freedom, eventually involving the entire laboratory and
beyond. But it is not unreasonable to apply a canonical model of quantum
Brownian motion in which the center of mass x-position of a C60 molecule
is linearly coupled to a bath of harmonic oscillators corresponding to the
modes of the entire silicon crystal to which it is bound by an assumed simple
harmonic potential. In this model, the relevant degree of freedom of the
molecule picks out a system A interacting with an environment system E
modeling the silicon surface. This model has been studied by Paz, Habib and
Zurek[21] and others.6 An agent may appeal to this model in assessing the
empirical signicance of NQMCs concerning a C60 molecule at the silicon
surface, and to justify application of the Born Rule to certain of these, even
while acknowledging that a more complex model might o¤er wiser counsel.
In this case, the model of quantum Brownian motion shows that after
a remarkably short time the quantum state of A will be expressible as a
mixture of narrow Gaussians, each approximating a point (x; px) in classical
phase space. Moreover, the weights of these states will be, and will for a long
time remain, equal to the corresponding phase space probability densities
as calculated from the Wigner functions of such Gaussians. An agent may
therefore associate a high degree of empirical content with a claim locating
a C60 molecule at a particular place on the silicon surface, and is therefore
entitled to apply the Born Rule to NQMCs of the form x , px using the
quantum state deduced by applying the Schrödinger equation to calculate
how the initial quantum state of a C60 molecule evolves before it reaches
the silicon surface. The high empirical content of such claims follows from
the justiability of material inferences to claims about values of (x; px) at
di¤erent times, as attestable by repeated measurements by the STM.
In the experiment of Ju¤man et al.[20], the center of mass fullerene wave-
function su¤ered negligible decoherence in the interferometer. So here an
agent should assign NQMCs of the form x  about C60 molecules minuscule
empirical content before they reach the silicon surface and so decline to apply
the Born Rule to then. The next experiment is interesting precisely because
it incorporates just such decoherence within the interferometer.
4.2 Inuence of molecular temperature on C70 coherence
Hackermüller et al.[23] investigated the e¤ects of increased temperature in
matter wave interferometer experiments in which fullerenes lose their quan-
tum behavior by thermal emission of radiation. They prepared a beam of
C70 molecules of well-dened velocity, passed them through two gratings
of a Talbot-Lau interferometer in a high vacuum, and detected those that
passed through a third movable grating set at the appropriate Talbot dis-
tance and used as a scanning mask, by ionizing them and collecting the ions
at a detector. Each molecule is su¢ ciently large and complex to be assigned
a temperature as it stores a considerable amount of energy in its internal
6 Schlosshauer[22] gives a more recent review.
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degrees of freedom.7 Interaction with the electromagnetic vacuum may re-
sult in emission of photons with an intensity and frequency that increases
as the internal temperature is raised. Entanglement between such photon
states and the state of the emitting molecule tends to induce environmental
decoherence.
Hackermüller et al.[23] present a theoretical model of this decoherence
that ts their observations quite well, as the observed interference dies away
when the molecules temperature is raised from 1000K to 3000K. Horn-
berger, Sipe and Arndt[24] give a more detailed exposition. An agent can use
this model to assess the empirical signicance of NQMCs concerning a C70
molecule as it traverses the interferometer. The model treats photon emission
by a fullerene as a sequence of independent, separate events, analogous to col-
lisions with gas particles (which occur relatively rarely, given the extremely
low pressure inside the interferometer). Since the process is stationary, the re-
duced quantum state for the C70 moleculescenter of mass degree of freedom
may be expressed as a function of position R in the interferometer as
0 (R1;R2) =  (R1;R2)  (R1  R2) (13)
where the decoherence function  (R1  R2) represents the e¤ect of decoher-
ence on the o¤-diagonal elements of the un-decohered reduced state  (R1;R2).
(It has no e¤ect on the diagonal elements, since limR1!R2 (R1  R2) = 1.)
Assuming photon emission is both isotropic and independent of R,  is a
function only of the spectral photon emission rate. This is not the same as
for a macroscopic black body since the emitting particle is small and not in
thermal equilibrium with a heat bath, and the emission is assumed to take
place at a xed internal energy rather than temperature. Given the assump-
tion that the emitting molecule has a denite energy E, it can be associated
with a microcanonical temperature T  given in terms of the entropy S(E)
by
T (E) =

@S(E)
@E
 1
(14)
So to assign an internal temperature to a beam of C70 molecules at each
point in the interferometer one must assume that each is always in a state
of denite energy except during photon emission, which is associated with a
transition between energy states. But what justies this assumption?
While it is decoherence of their center of mass quantum state that is
the focus of the model, one must also consider decoherence of the internal
state of the C70 molecules. Here a di¤erent model of decoherence is more
appropriate. While the fullerenes interact strongly with the electromagnetic
eld of the laser beams that heat them before entering the interferometer,
their electromagnetic interactions inside it are very weak at room tempera-
ture. Paz and Zurek[25] showed that in this "quantum limit", the reduced
internal quantum state of a system rapidly becomes approximately diagonal
in a basis of energy eigenstates as result of its interaction with the environ-
ment. This is what justies an agent in claiming that each fullerene has a
7 In fact, assignment of a temperature to each molecule is a step that requires
justication, as we shall see.
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denite internal energy within the interferometer, which may change if it
emits a photon. So decoherence plays a double role here. The model of (cen-
ter of mass) decoherence relevant to assigning empirical content to NQMCs
concerning the position of a fullerene in the interferometer shows how that
decoherence depends on the fullerenes temperature. But the justication for
assigning empirical content to a claim asserting such dependence rests on an
independent model of the fullerenes (internal energy) decoherence.8
Hackermüller et al.[23] detected their fullerenes by ionizing them after
the scanning mask and measuring the intensity of detected ions. The detec-
tion process involves focusing any ions produced on a conversion electrode,
then detecting the emitted electrons. How far does this indirect method of
observing the interference pattern a¤ect the application of the Born Rule
and the assignment of content to NQMCs of the form x  about fullerenes
at the scanning mask? As [24] shows, the geometry of the interferometer in
the experiment of Hackermüller et al.[23] is such that the probability den-
sity for fullerene x-position at the scanning mask predicted by unreective
application of the Born Rule to the un-decohered reduced state  (R1;R2)
corresponds to a smoothed image of the rst grating a pattern with the
same period d as the rst grating, with maximum intensity at the center of
the image of a slit window in the rst grating and minimum intensity at the
center of the image of a wall in the rst grating.
The detector system employed by Hackermüller et al.[23] operates by
measuring the ionization intensity for all C70 molecules passing through the
scanning mask at a particular x-setting. So it is insensitive to through which
slit in that third grating any particular fullerene may (or may not) have
passed. Since no apparatus is capable of detecting through which slit of the
second or third grating a fullerene passes, Feynman would forbid one to say
the fullerene passed through slit1 or... or slit i or...or slit Nj of either the 2nd
or 3rd (scanning mask) grating (j = 2; 3).
On the present pragmatist interpretation, because no signicant decoher-
ence occurred at either grating, a NQMC of the form x i about a fullerene
at the second or third grating has little or no empirical content, where  i
species the opening interval of the ith slit of either grating (i = 1; 2; :::.Nj).
The exclusive disjunction
(x 1) Y ::: (x i) Y ::: (x N3) (15)
regarding the position of a fullerene at the scanning mask therefore also lacks
the empirical content required to license its use as a premise in any inference.
((15) asserts that exactly one (x i) (i = 1; :::; N3) holds.)
Since the object of the experiment of Hackermüller et al.[23] is to investi-
gate the e¤ect of thermal decoherence on the fringes produced by quantum
8 There is a further subtlety here, since no claim about the entropy S or the
microcanonical temperature T  dened in terms of it is an NQMC. The entropy
is a function of the quantum state  given by the von Neumann expression S =
 Tr( log ), and so the interpretation of [1] denies that a claim assigning a value
either to S or to T  is an NQMC. But both S and T  are still just as objective
as the quantum state assignment , and an NQMC ascribing a value to E has
objective and well-dened empirical content.
17
interference of single fullerenes, it is obviously important to be able to justify
application of the Born Rule to both decohered and un-decohered reduced
states of fullerenes to compare their predicted detection intensities. However,
neither an NQMC of the form x i nor an exclusive disjunction (15) of such
NQMCs has enough empirical content to license application of the Born Rule
to such a claim about a fullerene at the third grating.
Yet there is a related NQMC to which the Born Rule may perhaps be
justiably applied, namely the inclusive disjunction
(x 1) _ ::: (x i) _ ::: (x N3) : (16)
One could use a claim of this form to say that a fullerene passed through
the third grating, without thereby implying that it passed through some
particular slit in that grating. Such a claim has some inferential power in
this situation. It supports the material inference to the true conclusion that
fullerenes will be detected by the ionization detector if, but only if, the slit
windows in the third grating are not blocked: One is entitled to make the
claim if, but only if, a beam of fullerenes emerges from the oven (as conrmed
by ionization detectors placed in front of the rst grating to measure the ini-
tial beam temperature). But one may question whether these inferences alone
endow (16) with enough empirical content to permit one to apply the Born
Rule here, since interaction with the third grating produces little decoherence
in the fullerenesquantum state.
The blue laser beam used to ionize fullerenes after the third grating does
interact strongly with them and substantially decoheres the beam, e¤ectively
localizing ionized fullerenes. At this point, a NQMC of the form x i about
an ionized fullerene has acquired a high degree of empirical content, and so
one is clearly entitled to apply the Born Rule to assign a probability to it, as
well as to (15) and (16). But the rule is here applied to the quantum state
after the third grating a state that played no part in the analysis of the
experiment! Ionization-induced decoherence is irrelevant to an application of
the Born Rule to the quantum state of the fullerenes at the third grating.
If one remains dissatised by the justication for applying the Born Rule
o¤ered two paragraphs back, another approach is available. This is to focus
instead on application of the Born Rule to a claim of the form x TOT , where
 TOT is an interval covering the whole range of x-positions where the blue
laser is capable of ionizing fullerenes so that the resulting ion can impact
the detector electrode and elicit a detection signal. Localization of ionization
events gives a high degree of empirical signicance to such a NQMC about a
fullerene in an ionization event. The experiment can be taken to show directly
how the frequency of these events varies with the x-setting of the scanning
mask when the fullerenes are heated to a specic temperature before entering
the interferometer. One can redescribe such a frequency as a measure of the
probability of detecting a fullerene at an x-position in a slit window rather
than a wall in the scanning mask while denying the signicance of the claim
that the fullerene had any x-position as it encountered the scanning mask.
This guarded way of speaking is common when quantum physicists discuss
applications of the Born Rule. It was subjected to withering criticism by
Bell[11]. But Bells objections do not apply when such talk is cashed out
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in terms of empirically signicant NQMCs to which the Born Rule may be
justiably applied, such as x TOT in this example.
4.3 Quantum theory in the universe
Quantum theory has been applied successfully to a wide range of terrestrial
phenomena outside the laboratory. Such applications have already provided
the basis for a thriving technology. We have overwhelming reasons to believe
that some natural phenomena to which quantum theory has been successfully
applied occurred long before there were laboratories, physicists or any other
agents capable of observing or applying quantum theory to them: we use the
quantum theory of radioactive decay to date them!
Quantum theory has been successfully applied to yield an understanding
of such extraterrestrial phenomena as the structure of the sun and many
other kinds of stars in our galaxy and far beyond, as well as their modes
of energy production, nucleosynthesis, birth and death. Quantum theories
of the Standard Model have been successfully applied to give us a detailed,
quantitative understanding of the evolution of matter in the early universe.
Quantum theories have been applied (albeit as yet more speculatively) to
predict the existence and nature of radiation from black holes and to the
development of large-scale structure in the extremely early universe. How is
quantum decoherence relevant to such applications of quantum theory "in
the wild"?
Much of what we know about the solar system, and almost everything
we know about what lies outside it, is based on evidence provided by analyz-
ing electromagnetic radiation, especially that emitted or absorbed by excited
atoms and molecules. Since quantum theory provides us with our best under-
standing of the processes involved in the emission and absorption of radiation
by atoms and molecules, it is only by applying quantum theory to phenom-
ena that occurred far away (and in many cases long ago) that we can justify
knowledge claims based on this evidence. No single, simple model of decoher-
ence can be expected to encompass all such phenomena. But in many cases
the atoms and molecules involved will be in an environment that decoheres
their internal states in an energy basis (cf. the discussion of emission by the
C70 molecules in section 4.2). It is such decoherence that justies one in
assuming that emission or absorption occurs between states of well-denide
internal energy, and so applying the Born Rule to calculate absorption or
emission probabilities.
Environmental decoherence in an energy basis provides a similar justi-
cation for application of the Born Rule to calculate rates of nuclear reaction
and decay in stellar nucleosynthesis. Here it is the nuclear energy levels that
decohere in consequence of environmental interactions.
Applications of the Standard Model to primordial nucleosynthesis in the
rst three minutes of the Big Bang have successfully accounted for observed
cosmic abundance of helium, deuterium and lithium-7. These applications de-
pend on calculations of rates for weak interaction processes including conver-
sion of a proton and electron into a neutron and neutrino. Such a calculation
proceeds by applying the Born Rule in the context of perturbation theory via
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Fermis golden rule (or some elaboration to take account of higher order terms
in a perturbation expansion). This application may once again be justied
by the decoherence due to interaction with the early universe environment
provided by the highly excited state of the quantized electromagnetic eld.
Part II will discuss quantum eld-theoretic models of decoherence.
5 Summary and outlook
If a quantum state does not describe or represent physical properties of a
system to which it is assigned, it must have some other function. In the
pragmatist interpretation outlined in [1] it has one role within a model of
quantum theory and a second role in guiding the application of a model.
Within a model, the quantum state functions as input to the Born Rule for
calculating probabilities of canonical NQMCs of the form Q: There is no
mention of measurement, either in these NQMCs or in the Born Rule itself.
Within a model, Bells([14],[11]) requirement is met that the theory should
be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion
of the theoretical physicist. However, in order to apply a quantum model it
is necessary to assess the signicance of NQMCs concerning the system(s)
which are the intended target of the application.
Physicists have acquired practical expertise in this task, guided by infor-
mal maxims like Wheelers "No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is
an observed phenomenon" and by Bohrs view that the entire experimental
setup provides us with the dening conditions for the application of classi-
cal concepts in the domain of quantum physics. But while the application
of models in physics always requires skill and judgment, Bell([14],[11]) was
surely right to complain about reliance here on such vague and anthropocen-
tric terms as measurement, observationand experimental setup.
There is nothing anthropocentric about environmental delocalization of
coherence. In the pragmatist interpretation outlined in [1] quantum models of
decoherence govern the signicance of NQMCs and their suitability for appli-
cation of the Born Rule. The extension of a quantum model of a target system
to include its environment yields a principled and non-anthropocentric way
of using quantum theory to guide its own application.
This does not eliminate the need for judgment and discretion. Existing
quantum models of environmental decoherence incorporate many idealiza-
tions and/or approximations known to hold only in highly controlled labo-
ratory experiments. Choosing one model rather than another as a basis for
assessing the signicance of NQMCs and their suitability for application of
the Born Rule requires skill and judgment, especially when the intended tar-
get system is in an uncontrolled and epistemically inaccessible environment.
By using an inappropriate model of decoherence, an agent might come to
apply the Born Rule to an unsuitable NQMC. But any such mistake would
be subject to correction by standard scientic methods.
The foundational signicance of environmental delocalization of coher-
ence in the pragmatist interpretation outlined in [1] makes it important to
improve our understanding by constructing, analyzing and (if possible) test-
ing new and more realistic models. To my knowledge, there has not been
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much interest in modeling the environmental decoherence su¤ered by astro-
physical or cosmological systems including those mentioned in section 4.3.
This attitude may seem justiable if quantum theory is simply a tool for
calculating probabilities for outcomes of laboratory experiments. But it is
indefensible from the pragmatist view of quantum theory outlined in [1].
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